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for manufacture.33 The original justification for the rule was based
on a consideration of the commercial nature of the transaction and
the effect of the tax upon commerce. 34 The justification is, however,
not logically applicable to imports for manufacture. The dissenting
opinion repudiates the extension.3 5 It is submitted that an extension
in this case is to make the test of an original package "an ultimate
principle36 and that the balancing of the interest of the states in
revenue37 with the tax immunity granted under the imports-and-ex-
ports clause is best achieved by resort to a substantive rather than to
a formal test for the duration of the immunity.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STATE REGULATION AND ENCLAVED FEDERAL TERRITORY
Army officers on a military reservation within the boundaries of a
dry state forwarded orders for liquor through a club secretary to an
outstate dealer. While in transit by common carrier under a uniform
bill of lading, the shipment was seized by state officers for confiscation
and destruction under the Oklahoma Permit Law.1  A state law made
33. E.g. less than 1/10 of 1% of the Hooven & Allison Co. purchases
of imports were spot purchases. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, Tax
Commr., 142 Ohio St. 235, 237 (1943).
34. See arguments developed in cases cited note 30 supra. Notice
the preservation of protection for the privilege of selling as re-
tained in the commerce -clause under other tests. See citations
note 10 supra.
35. Principal case at 888.
36. Cf. " . . . the test of the original package is not an ultimate
principle. It is an illustration of a principle . . . What is ulti-
mate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another
may not place itself in a position of economic isolation." Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, at 526-527 (1935) (interstate com-
merce).
37. The total revenue from real and personal property taxes in 1941
was 4 billion, 5 million; the states' share being 250 million and
the remainder going to political subdivisions. "Statistical Abstract
for 1943" (1943) 282. Estimated at an average of state ad valorem
tax rates of 6 mills to the dollar, $15,263,936 taxes would have
accrued to the states in 1940 had the rule been enforced in accord
with the minority opinion.
A possible solution of the definition of the termination of
the immunity of an import lies in legislation along the line of
the Wisconsin exemption of "merchandise placed in storage in
original package in a commercial storage warehouse or public
wharf." Wis. State (1943) tit. X, c. 70 § 11(37). See also C.C.H.
"State Tax Guide Service" (1941) 52-000.
1. Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 37§ 41-48.
Amendment XXI, § 2, gives a dry state the power to forbid
all importation of intoxicating liquor into the state or to adopt
a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition. State Board
of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); Ma-
honey v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304, U.S. 401 (1937). A state
may also require a permit for the transportation of intoxi-
cants in interstate commerce through the state as a means of
establishing the identity of transporters, their routes and points
of destination and of enabling local officers to take appropriate
[Vol. 20
1945] NOTES AND COMMENTS 327
possession of intoxicants for personal use received from a common
carrier unlawful.2 The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act adopts the
penal laws of a state, in so far as such laws have rot displaced by
specific acts of Congress, as the governing federal law for enforce-
ment in federal areas.3  A Federal Court granted injunctive relief
to compel the officials to return the liquor and to refcain from inter-
fering with the delivery.4 Certiorari granted. Held: that carrier acted
in good faith and neither the United States, the War Department, nor
army officers were represented in litigation, and relief will not be
denied on theory that federal laws may in consequence be violated. 5
Dissent: a violation of a police regulation ought not to be furthered
by a federal court. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 64 Sup. Ct.
622 (1944).
The Assimilative Crimes ActT provides that "whoever, within the
measures to insure transportation without diversion. Duckworth
v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 396; 138 A.L.R. 1144 (1941).
The Oklahoma statute, enacted to secure the benefit of the
Federal Liquor Enforcement Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 877 § 202(b),
27 U.S.C.A. 9 § 221), was identical in wording with the Arkansas
statute. Cf. State of Arkansas v. Duckworth, 201 Ark. 1123, 148
S.W. (2d) 656 (1941). Compare principal case at 624.
30 An. Jud. "Intoxicating Liquors," 383 §§ 232, 239 et seq.;
15 C.J.S. "Commerce," § 99, note 27 at 452.
2. Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 37 39 (enacted 1917; actively en-
forced for more than twenty-five years; constitutionality unques-
tioned in state courts). The Federal Court held this statute un-
constitutional. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Company, 137 F. (2d) 274,
277 (C.C.A. 10th, 1943). Compare principal case: majority opinion
at 627, dissenting opinion at 629. Cf. Commission of Texas et
al. v. Pullman Co. et al., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
3. 54 Stat. 304 (1940), 18 U.S.C.A. § 451 and 54 Stat. 234 (1940,,
18. U.S.C.A. § 468; Cr. Code §§ 272 and 289; carried as § 857
of 1940 Supplement to the Military Laws of the United States.
4. Yellow Cab Company v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 594 (1943). Deci-
sion on the ground that a state has no power to forbid an interstate
commerce shipment of intoxicants through its territory; assim-
ilative crimes problem sidestepped. Equitable grounds for grant-
ing relief to carrier found under rule in Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S. 70 (1911).
5. Justice Black: "Considering the difficulty and importance of a
correct decision of the novel issues which an attempt to construe
this federal statute would present . . .we are convinced that
in the interests of the sound administration of justice we should
refrain from a complete exploration of these issues in this pro-
ceeding, especially since these issues are only collateral," prin-
cipal case at 626.
6. Justices Frankfurter and Roberts dissenting. The reasoning of
the dissent proceeded: Oklahoma statutes make delivery and
receipt of intoxicants for personal use as a beverage a crime if
the delivery is made in Oklahoma; the Assimilative Crimes Act
had made the same acts .Federal crimes in the Fort Sill area;
the liquor would be illegal and contraband at its point of destina-
tion; and an equity court should not aid the accomplishment of
illegal acts. See also, dissenting opinion of Circuit Court Judge
Murrah. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 137 F. (2d) 274 (C.C.A.
10th, 1943).
7. Constitutionality upheld. Franklin v. United States, 516 U.S.
559 (1910).
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territorial limits of a state, within or upon any lands reserved, 8 or
acquired 9 for the use of the United States and under the exclusive o
or concurrent" jurisdiction thereof, shall do any act or thing which
is not made penal by any act of Congress, 12 but which if committed
within the jurisdiction of the state, by the laws in force on" the date
mentioned in the Act, 13 "would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a
like offense and subject to a like punishment."' 4 By adoption, state
penal laws become federal laws in force in the designated places's
and are not enforceable by the state.16
From the history17 of this act, which has been in effect for more
than a century, it will be seen that its purpose was to satisfy a lack
of a comprehensive Federal Criminal Code.' 8 There are no common
law offenses against the United States and the criminal jurisdiction
of the United States is derived exclusively from specific statutes.'9
8. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
9. Does not apply to purchase at tax sale" without consent of state.
United States v. Penn, 48 Fed. 669 (C.C.E.D.Va. 1880); after-ac-
quired legislative consent sufficient. United States v. Tucker,
122 Fed. 518 (W.D. Ky. 1903).
10. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17 gives Congress power to "exercise exclusive
legislation in all cases whatsoever over . . . all places purchased
by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same
shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings." "Other needful buildings" construed
to include: custom house, Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 726 (C.C. Cal.
1885); post office, Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1907).
"Forts" to include: navy yard, United States v. Dolan, 25 Fed.
Cas. 887, No. 14,978 (E.D. N.Y. 1865).
11. Whether the national government acquired exclusive jurisdiction
depends upon terms of the state legislature's consent or cession.
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
12. Query: Must the local law be consistent with Federal policy? The
cases have not dealt with this question. Relative to local civil
laws, it has been said, "local law not inconsistent with Federal
Policy remains in force, until altered by national legislation."
James Stewart & Co., Inc. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
13. United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (N.Y. 1832); United States v.
Barney, 24 Fed. Cas. 1011, No. 14,524 (S.D. N.Y. 1866).
14. United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 198 (W.D. Tenn. 1880).
15. Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 726 (C.C. Cal. 1895).
16. Washington P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Magruder, 198 Fed. 218 (D.C. Md.
1912); People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Company, 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
17. The forerunner of the instant statute was the act of March 3,
1825, Chap. 65, 4 Stats. 115. Justice Story was the author. 1
Warren, "The Supreme Court in United States History" 440-443;
1 Gales and Seaton, "Debates in Congress, 1824-1825" 154, 157,
165, 168, 335, 338.
18. "This is the most important section of the whole bill. The Crim-
inal Code of the United States is singularly defective and in-
efficient. . . . Few, very few, of.the practical crimes (if I may
so say) are punishable by statutes, and if the courts have no
general common-law jurisdiction (which is a vexed question),
they are wholly dispuishable. . . . Rapes, arsons, batteries, and
a host of other crimes may in these places be now committed
with impunity." 1 Story, "Life of Justice *Story" (1851) 293.
19. See United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199 (1882).
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The coverage of the Federal Criminal Code is comparatively meager.20
Congress could have enacted a comprehensive Federal Code to cover
all Federal areas without reference to the state in which they were
enclaved.21 Congress chose rather to refer to the penal laws of the
state in which the different Federal areas were enclaved as the source
for the governing law. The choice was made with regard for state
autonomy. 22
There is a dearth of authority, both in the decisions23 and in
scholarly comment, upon the scope of the Assimilative Crimes Act.
It has been held applicable to the "ordinary crimes." 24 It has, directly
or by implication, been held inapplicable to "police regulations."25
By implication, the majority opinion limits the statute to crimes
"involving moral turpitude." The effect of such an interpretation is
to make wholly dispunishable certain acts contrary to rhe public policy
of the state in which the federal area is enclaved. Ncnenforcement of
police regulations in the numerous federal areas 26 within a state would
inevitably course backwards to play a part in undermining the policy
declared essential by the state. The dissenting opinion supports the
application of the statute to "police regulations." It is submitted
20. See United States v. Press Publishing Company, 219 U.S. 1 (1911);
21. Express power given in Const. Art. 1 § 8, cl. 17.
22. 1 Gales and Seaton, "Debates in Congress, 1824-1825" 154 ff.; See
United States v. Press Publishing Company, 219 U.S. 1 (1911);
James Stewart & Co., Inc. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
23. See United States v. Press Publishing Company, 219 U.S. 1 (1911);
principal case at 626.
24. Assault, State v. Morris, 76 N.J. 222, 68 Atl. 1103 (1908); assault
with intent to kill, United States v. Dolan, 25 Fed. Cas. 887, No.
14,978 (E.D. N.Y. 1865); murder, United States v. Andem, 158
Fed. 996 (D.C. N.J. 1908); rape, United States v. Partello, 48
Fed. 670 (C.C. Mont. 1891); adultery, Southern Surety Co. v.
State, 34 Okl. 781, 127 Pac. 409 (1912) aff. 241 U.S. 582 (1916);
libel and slander, United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S.
1 (1911); larceny, United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 781, No.
14,930 (C.C. Mass. 1829) false pretenses, Biddle -. United States,
156 Fed. 759 (C.C.A. 9th, 1907); embezzlement, United States v.
Franklin, 154 Fed. 163 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1909), writ or error dis.,
Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910).
25. Regulations for shipping vessels, Mitchell v. Tibbctts, 17 Pick 298
(Mass. 1835); regulations for delivery of telegram messages,
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909); standards
for milk, Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dept. of Agriculture of
California, 318 U.S. 285 (1943) (by implication); prohibitory
liquor statutes, Collins et al. v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304
U.S. 518 (1938) (by implication), Crater Lake National Park Co.
v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 26 F. Supp. 363 (D.C. Ore.
1939).
26. The significance of the problem is indicated by the fact that,
according to the recent Byrd report, one-fifth of the area of the
United States is now held as Federal land. E.g. National Parks,
military reservations, national forests, unappropriated public lands,
public buildings, dams, post offices, defense projects, etc. The
Assindlative Crimes Act is, if literally applied, applicable to all
such areas. It must be noted, however, that the principal case
is not a decision construing this statute. See principal case at 626.
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that "so long as there is no over-riding national purpose to be served,
nothing is gained by making federal enclaves thorns in the sides of
the States and barriers to the effective state-wide performance" 27 of
the police policy of the state.28
Two solutions exist: (1) construe the Assimilative Crimes Act
to include "police regulations," or (2) cede jurisdiction to the state.
It is suggested that Congress might desirably cede jurisdiction to the
State for enforcement of police regulations within Federal areas.29
CRIMINAL LAW
SELF INCRIMINATION
Defendant petitioner, Samuel Feldman, was convicted under a
federal statute, of fraudulently "kiting" checks through the mails.
Conviction affirmed.2  Certiorari to determine whether the forced
admission in a federal court, of testimony previously given by him in
supplementary proceedings in a state court,3 deprived him of the pro-
tection of the fifth Amendment.4  Held: affirmed. The admission of
testimony in the federal court, previously given by the accused in the
27. Judge Murphy in dissent, continued, "Indeed both the federal gov-
ernment and the nation as a whole suffer if the solution of
legitimate matters of local concern is thus thwarted and local
animosity is created for no purpose." Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc.
v. Dept. of Agriculture of California, 318 U.S., 285, 305 (1943).
In a concurring dissent, Judge Frankfurter said, "Enough has
been said to show that the doctrine of 'exclusive jurisdiction' over
federal enclaves is not imperative. The phrase is indeed a mis-
nomer for the manifold legal phases of the diverse situations
arising out of the existence of federally owned lands within a
state." Ibid., 300.
28. The police power of the state is an indispensable prerogative to
state sovereignty, and "at times the most insistent, and always
one of the least limitable powers of government." Eubank v.
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912); Classon v. Indiana, 306 U.S.
439 (1938); Ziffrin Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
29. "The possible importance of reserving to the state jurisdiction
for local purposes which involve no interference with the per-
formance of governmental functions is becoming more and more
clear as the activities of the government expand and large areas
within the states are acquired." James v. Dravo Const. Co., 302
U.S. 134, (1937).
Congress has expressly ceded jurisdiction to the state over
federal enclaves for Workmen's Compensation Laws (Act of June
25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1938, 40 U.S.C.A. 290) and for enforcement of
state income, sales and use tax acts (the Buck Act of Oct. 9, 1940,
54 Stat. 1059, 4 U.S.C.A. 13-18).
1. 35 Stat. 1130 (1009), 18 U.S.C.A. § 338 (1927).
2. 136 F. (2d) 394 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
3. Feldman was called on as a witness in supplementary proceedings
designed to aid in the discovery of assets of a debtor. New York
Civil Practice Act, art. 45, § 789. New York immunity statute
protected him from further action in that state. New York Laws
1935, c. 630, § 789 as amended by New York Laws 1938, c. 108. § 17.
4. U.S. Const. Amend. V. "No person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
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